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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
4	Case No. 05-44481	
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6	In the Matter of:	
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8	DELPHI CORPORATION ET AL,	
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10	Debtor.	
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14	United States Bankruptcy Court	
15	One Bowling Green	
16	New York, New York	
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18	January 17, 2008	
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21	BEFORE:	
22	HON. ROBERT D. DRAIN	
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE	
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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Please be seated. Okay. We're back on the record in Delphi Corporation. When we adjourned, we left it that at least two or three objectors were going to try to speak with the debtors to see if they could resolve some of their objections, for example, Pima County and the fiduciary corporation. So first, why don't I hear of any of those -- any objections have been resolved over the course of the break?

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, Jack
Butler on behalf of the debtors. We are here, Your Honor,
on that portion of the hearing. We have had a chance over
the course of the noon recess to partially settle one
objection and to completely settle eight other objections.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: And so I'll indicate what those objections are now using the chart that is on the screen, which is page 27 of exhibit, I believe, 158.

MALE SPEAKER: Object -- could I just interrupt for one second? I apologize, but, Your Honor, in view of the scheduling that we've discussed, at least my office and I would like to go back to our office and begin to work on what we talked about, so --

THE COURT: That's fine.

MALE SPEAKER: -- if you don't mind, we'll be --

THE COURT: That's fine. And in that regard, let me just say that we -- looking at the clock, looking at the calendar for today it seemed appropriate to proceed as follows with the rest of today's hearing. It appears to me that the only considerable evidentiary aspect of the confirmation hearing to come involves the master employee or master executive compensation aspect of the debtor's request for confirmation. It appeared to me to be more efficient to leave that portion of the record until tomorrow and that for today, we would deal with that portion of Mr. Miller's testimony that doesn't deal with employee matters, but rather deals with the rest of the debtor's case.

Then I would hear oral argument on the remaining objections, other than the two union objections, and then we pick up tomorrow with the evidentiary record on the employee/union issues.

So if there are people here who are here solely for the employee/union matters and you don't want to stay, you're certainly free to go at this point.

MALE SPEAKER: And what time will we resume tomorrow morning, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Ten o'clock.

MALE SPEAKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MALE SPEAKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

FEMALE SPEAKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So again, Mr. Butler.

MR. BUTLER: All right. So turning back again to page 27 of Exhibit 158, which was the remaining objections, I'll start with Pima County, which is the one you asked about, Your Honor. That has been settled. That's at Docket Number 11823. We have agreed to represent on the record that which I think Your Honor had discussed before we got off the record earlier today and that is the debtors do agree that with respect to secured claims post-petition interest includes interest that accrues up to the date the claim is paid in full. I think that, in fact, is -- they're secured claims. They get interest in accordance with their claim.

THE COURT: If they're over secured.

MR. BUTLER: If they're over secured, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: Correct. To the extent they're secured. We will add language to the confirmation order. This sis the same language we have agreed to with other taxing authorities, just to state it on the record. There will be a provision added to the confirmation order with respect to secured tax claims. It says, "Notwithstanding ending in Article 5.1 of the plan to the contrary, any holder of the secured claim which claim arose as a result

of a tax secured by a lien shall retain its lien in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law until the claim is paid in full with post-petition interest as provided in the plan and the payment of the secured claim shall not include the treatments set forth in Article 2.2 of the plan. This is to make sure that they retain their liens," which is this was not a liens-driven case.

THE COURT: All right. And that seems implicit in the language anyway, but I don't mind repeating it to alleviate people's concern.

MR. BUTLER: So that resolves Pima County 1123, so they're not settled.

We were able to resolve audio MPEG, Inc. That's at docket --

MALE SPEAKER: Your Honor, if I may interrupt. I'm just on the line since [inaudible] you were [inaudible].

THE COURT: Yes, you may. Thank you very much.

MALE SPEAKER: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Okay. Audio MPEG?

MR. BUTLER: Yeah, docket number -- docket number 11883, Audio MPEG, Inc. has also settled. I will before we close the record today read a couple things into the record with respect to that, everything being worked out, Your Honor, but that is now resolved so I owe you that.

The next matter that's settled is docket number

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16 11888, Fujikura America, Inc. They have -- this is a cure notice issue that I believe Mr. Berger resolved earlier in the matter, but this is just a cure matter. There's nothing that needs to be said here on the record. THE COURT: This is Fujikura, right? MR. BUTLER: Fujikura. Excuse me. THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So that objection is going to be withdrawn? MR. BUTLER: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. MR. BUTLER: The next matter that's been resolved is docket number 11908, the Riverside Claims, LLC objection. That is a claims reconciliation matter. We're treating it like we treated LSI and like we treated the other trade claimants earlier. We're just going to reconcile their claims. We talked to them about it in good faith --THE COURT: All right. MR. BUTLER: -- a commercial reasonable basis. THE COURT: There's no agreement as to a certain amount --MR. BUTLER: No. THE COURT: -- but you're going to expedite the

process to do it on a good faith, commercially reasonable basis?

MR. BUTLER: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: The next matter that's been settled is we have settled completely the objection of Law Debenture Trust Company of New York at docket number 11935. We've partially settled the objection of Wilmington Trust Company at docket number 12012 and this has to do with the mechanism to address the fees that would be owed to counsel for the indenture trustee. There is a mechanism that will go into the proposed confirmation order. It's been reviewed with the United States Trustee, I believe, and is acceptable to the parties.

MR. FOX: Edward Fox, Your Honor, for Wilmington

Trust Company. Mr. Butler is correct. We gave him some

language to modify the provision of the plan -- or the

provision of the confirmation order dealing with this

issue. We've been advised that they've accepted the

language that we gave them. I've also discussed it with

Ms. Leonard from the U.S. Trustee's Office.

I would just ask Mr. Butler to confirm that we're correct in our expectation that the debtors will be making the distribution to the senior noteholders to Wilmington Trust as a servicer to then be made to the bondholders.

MR. BUTLER: I assume that's correct. I'm not -that wasn't part of our settlement, so I'm not -- are you
asking me a question out the clear blue? You know, I

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Pg 18 of 94 18 assume that's correct, but I'd like to double-check with our folks now --MR. FOX: That'd be fine. MR. BUTLER: -- get with you off the record about the. MR. FOX: Okay. THE COURT: Just for my edification having reviewed those objections the two indenture trustees or servicers claims will be recognized on a contract basis, not a 503(b) basis? MR. BUTLER: That's correct, Your Honor. MR. FOX: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. And then there's a mechanism for reviewing the fees as -- under the contract? MR. FOX: Yeah, I can hand up the market --THE COURT: No, that's okay. I just wanted to make sure I understood the basic concept of it. MR. FOX: The concept is we'll submit the invoices to the debtor, the committee, and the fee committee. They'll have ten business days to review them. If they're in accord will be paid. If they have an issue, then the undisputed portion will be paid. The disputed portion will be brought before Your Honor to resolve.

THE COURT: And will they be paid like other unsecured claims?

19 1 MR. FOX: It'll be paid in cash. 2 THE COURT: Okay. And that resolves the lien issue? 3 MR. FOX: Once they're paid, yes. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. JONAS: Your Honor, Jeff Jonas from Brown 6 Rudnick, the Law Debenture, and that's acceptable to us. 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MR. JONAS: Thank you. 9 THE COURT: And then the other -- but Mr. Butler said 10 "partially settles." The other aspect of your objection, 11 Mr. Fox, was on feasibility and that's still open? 12 MR. FOX: Yes, that's correct. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MALE SPEAKER: Your Honor, if I may, I don't want to 15 interrupt your train of thought, but I didn't consider 16 the -- Mr. Fox has characterized his objection as a 17 feasibility objection. The Committee considers it more of 18 just a timing of the entry of an order issue. 19 THE COURT: I'm just using shorthand. 20 MALE SPEAKER: Yeah, well, I just wanted the Court to 21 understand that notwithstanding that we didn't join in 22 Mr. Fox's feasibility objection, we do agree with him that 23 the order should not be entered until the exit financing 24 commitments have been obtained.

THE COURT: But that's for down the road.

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20 1 MALE SPEAKER: Yes. I just wanted to make sure you 2 were aware of it. 3 THE COURT: All right. 4 MALE SPEAKER: Thank you. 5 MR. BUTLER: Yeah, and we at -- the Committee didn't 6 file an objection. We can argue all this in oral 7 argument. 8 THE COURT: And I was just using feasibility as 9 shorthand for that other aspect of his objection. 10 MR. BUTLER: The next objection that's been settled, 11 Your Honor, is objection -- docket number 11940, retiree 12 claims. That matter has been resolved. That had mostly 13 to do with sorting through estimated amounts for the 14 rights offering and related matters, but that has -- that 15 issue has been resolved. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. BUTLER: I'm also pleased to report, Your 18 Honor --19 THE COURT: Not only that issue, but the whole 20 objection is withdrawn? 21 MR. BUTLER: Correct. The whole objection has been 22 resolved. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. BUTLER: I'm also very pleased to report, Your

Honor, that objection 11944, Equity Corporate Housing,

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which was the class 6C objection has been resolved. That was a claims issue, which has been resolved in the claims process, but they're not pressing anything here at the confirmation hearing.

THE COURT: Okay. And again, there are no promises as to treatment of that claim. It's just going to be resolved on a good-faith, expedite basis?

MR. BUTLER: I need to check with Mr. Lyons on that one. Can I have one minute, Your Honor, so I can give you the information correctly?

[Pause in the proceedings.]

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, as I understand it, there's been no special promises made here in connection with this. There was -- the claim was split into two parts, one that was undisputed by the debtors, which was going to be allowed and the piece that the debtors do not agree with is going to go through the claims process.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I think that covers all of the settled objections and partially settled objections.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: So there should have been eight settled objections. Yeah, eight settled objections and one partially settled objection from the recitation I made this moment at the commencement of the hearing.

THE COURT: All right. So --

MR. BUTLER: Oh, I didn't mention AT&T. I'm sorry. Excuse me. Thank you. One of the eight I did not -- it was within the eight. Thank you. Yeah, I have it. AT&T entities, Your Honor, at 11894 is also withdrawn. I had that marked as settled and I didn't read it.

THE COURT: Okay. And I'm assuming there was no special treatment to them because their objection didn't really call for it. They just -- it was --

MALE SPEAKER: That's right, Your Honor. It was a cure issue that had --

THE COURT: It was the type of objection you would have expected from the phone company.

MALE SPEAKER: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. BUTLER: So, Your Honor, I believe if I have it correctly -- I just want to make sure I've got it correctly here.

MS. DOWD: Excuse me, Your Honor. Could I -- I apologize that I didn't get back in the courtroom in time to hear Mr. Butler's presentation about the settlement with my client. I was on the phone with my client. As I communicated with my client we do have a settlement, but they wanted to look at the language and neither I nor my client have received that language that was actually

written up.

MR. BUTLER: I can actually help you out on this. I didn't read the language.

MS. DOWD: You didn't read it?

MR. BUTLER: I said that we had a settlement and I would read it later on in the hearing.

THE COURT: Right. He did say that.

MS. DOWD: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. DOWD: And there were some subtle -- which I hope you will resolve -- some subtle open terms, but I think we're, you know, 95 percent there. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's what I took away from what Mr. Butler said.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I believe based on the discussions we had this morning, and parties in the courtroom I'm sure will correct me if I'm wrong, in terms of parties who had objections that said they were appearing either, you know, by the objector or by counsel or another representative that we're here this morning, I believe that resolves all of what I'll call the represented objections other than the union objections, which are being dealt with tomorrow, and the following objections.

I believe that the Timken Company objection, docket

number 11927, has not been resolved. I believe the -what I think are more or less -- well, I won't
characterize them. The objections of the lead plaintiff
in prospective class at 11939 and the ERISA-lead
plaintiffs at 11973 have not been resolved. I believe
that the Fiduciary Counselors, Inc. objection at 11957 has
not been resolved.

I believe the -- and let me just see here if I missed one -- Equistar Chemicals was not represented earlier today. They haven't [ph.] resolved, but I think they're represented, so I think that is the world of the represented objections.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: Other than the union objections.

THE COURT: All right. So do you want to proceed then with Mr. Miller?

MR. BUTLER: I do, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: And again, as I stated earlier, given that I'm handling the discrete issue of the executive employee compensation issue -- or proposal and the union objections tomorrow, Mr. Miller will come back to the stand if need be tomorrow on those aspects of his declaration.

MR. BUTLER: Yes, Your Honor. So for today we're dealing with the declaration of Robert S. Miller, Jr., the

company's executive chairman and admit it into evidence
Exhibit 67 subject to an evidentiary matter that we'll
resolve tomorrow in connection with the union portion of
the hearing and his deposition, which has been admitted as
Exhibit 551. I'd like to present Mr. Miller for all
purposes of cross-examination, other than the management
compensation portions of Exhibit 67 and Exhibit 551 and
for any questions the Court might have.

THE COURT: Okay. As far as the declaration, you're going to wait until tomorrow to have it be admitted?

MR. BUTLER: Well, it was admitted already, Your Honor, subject to the evidentiary objection of the --

THE COURT: Oh, that's right. Of course.

MR. BUTLER: -- UAW, which we'll deal with tomorrow.

THE COURT: That's right.

MR. BUTLER: We're now just presenting him for examination or questions by the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone want to cross-examine Mr. Miller on his declaration as just discussed, as well as on the topic of his deposition as just discussed?

Okay. And I have no questions of Mr. Miller either.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Now, Your Honor, I believe that completes the evidentiary record, other than -- I believe all of the evidentiary exhibits are in with the exception of

resolving the evidentiary objections of the UAW on Exhibits 66 and 67. That was paragraph 25 and 66 and paragraph 48 on 67, two of the declarants we'll deal with tomorrow.

I believe all of the other exhibits are now in evidence and I believe all the declarations are now in. See if there's cross-examination offered on all the declarations other than Mr. Naylor and Mr. Bubnovich, who will be dealt with tomorrow morning and the compensation section of Mr. Miller's declaration.

So in terms of next steps, Your Honor, the debtors had planned to reserve our closing argument until tomorrow after the completion of whatever the proceedings are tomorrow, but we'd be prepared to address objections -- specific objections if Your Honor wants to hear those. There are a handful of, as I indicated, objectors who are represented today.

THE COURT: I think we should use the remaining time today to deal with the remaining objections, other than the two union objections.

MR. BUTLER: All right.

THE COURT: Maybe I should hear from the objectors, then, who are present either in person or by phone.

Debtors can respond to them and then they can briefly address the objections made by those who are just content

to rely on their papers.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. So maybe the -THE COURT: So whoever -- I don't care who wants to
go first.

MS. CALOWAY: Your Honor, Mary Caloway, Buchanan,
Ingersoll & Rooney. I'd like to go first for one reason
I'm the closest and second is I think mine is one of the
easiest objections to discuss and resolve.

THE COURT: Remind me again.

MS. CALOWAY: It's Fiduciary Counselors.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CALOWAY: We had filed a joinder to the objection filed by the Pension and Benefit Guaranty Corporation.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. CALOWAY: With the resolution of the Pension and Benefit Guaranty Corporation's objection, that portion of the joinder is essentially mooted.

We had also included in our joinder an independent request that the debtors add four words or put on the record clarification by using those four words that the language in the plan didn't affect the individual debtor's joint and several liability under the applicable pension laws.

My understanding from the debtor's response is that they were -- that they believe the language is abundantly

clear and that those four words aren't necessary. Quite frankly, since I've sat here all day I've decided I think it's worth it to stand up and tell Your Honor that I don't think the addition of those four words harms anyone and it does provide Fiduciary Counselors as the independent fiduciary for the pension plans a certain amount of comfort.

With that, Your Honor, I would sit down.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there any debtor that wouldn't be covered individually by the minimum funding requirements under 26 --

MS. CALOWAY: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I may not have been as clear as I should have been. We were concerned that the deemed substantive consolidation provision might be misread to somehow affect that joint and several liability.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: No, I understand that.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the reason we didn't agree to the words is quite simply that we don't want to expand any rights that may not exist.

THE COURT: Well, that --

MR. BUTLER: So consolidation only covered for voting and distribution. No other purpose.

THE COURT: Right. They have --

MR. BUTLER: Whatever rights they have, they have.

THE COURT: That's why I was starting to ask the question I had. Is there a possibility that some of the debtors -- or some of the debtors on an individual basis wouldn't necessarily be jointly and severally liable?

MR. BUTLER: And the truthful answer, Your Honor, is

I just don't know. I mean, and I wasn't prepared to agree

to language that could arguably expand liability --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BUTLER: -- exposure when it's unnecessary given what they are trying to protect.

THE COURT: The substantive consolidation provision is for distribution for purposes of this plan.

MR. BUTLER: Correct.

THE COURT: Only.

MR. BUTLER: Right.

THE COURT: Distributions under this plan.

MR. BUTLER: Correct. Then only -- the actual consolidating of the businesses, Your Honor, or the entities to the extent that that's been planned to be done, that's done under the restructuring transactions notice that was filed as a separate exhibit to the plan and that will occur either preeffective date or posteffective date as the case may be.

But that -- when those things occur, they'll occur in

connection with the overall, you know, obligation requirements the company has to go through and do those combinations, liquidations, and so forth. But there's nothing in the subcon portion of this plan that would affect the joint and several liability -- you know, cause someone's joint and several liability -- preexisting joint and several liability to be eliminated.

THE COURT: In other words, payment in respect of -under -- existing under funding will be made pursuant to
the plan, but if for some reason they aren't made down the
road, the plan doesn't affect individual debtor's
liability, whatever that is.

MR. BUTLER: Whatever that is to the extent it exists.

THE COURT: Okay. That was my reading of the plan and while we could spend a lot of time going through 26 U.S.C. 412 and 29 U.S.C. 1082 and 1362, I think that's pretty dangerous if you have one bankruptcy lawyer, one bankruptcy judge being asked to make a determination on -- under pension law.

MS. CALOWAY: 319. There are two bankruptcy lawyers,
Your Honor --

THE COURT: Okay. Two bankruptcy lawyers and a bankruptcy judge, so I think it's -- I think your client is protected on the issue you're concerned about and I

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Timken who during the course of the bankruptcy proceeding

entered into a settlement stipulation with the debtor.

Pursuant to that stipulation, the debtor and Timken

stipulated that Timken had an allowed claim of

approximately 1.8 million dollars and that the claim was

deemed satisfied pursuant to the previous payment of the

1.8 million pursuant to an assumption of an agreement that

had been previously agreed to.

The parties specifically reserved the right to -- whether or not post-petition interest should be payable for the period of time from the petition date through the date of the payments approximately a 14-month period. So we're talking -- you know, it's not a huge issue, but the question in essence is because other creditors, unsecured creditors in the case are being -- are entitled to receive interest, Timken does not believe that there's any basis for not also paying interest.

THE COURT: I want to make sure I understand this.

Your client has already gotten the money, though, right,
as part of a cure payment?

MR. SULLIVAN: Without interest, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But as part of the assumption of the contract.

MR. SULLIVAN: It's received the full principal amount. Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But at the time it didn't -- when it got

that money, when the contract was assumed and payment was made under 365(b) that was the agreed amount.

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, the agreement specifically talked about the -- you know, the prepetition balance. It didn't -- it was silent as to whether or not there'd be any post-petition interest payable.

THE COURT: But was there a reserva -- I mean --

MR. SULLIVAN: There's no reservation of rights, but at the time there was no even indication that this would be 100 percent plan and the post-petition interest would even be payable and --

THE COURT: But isn't that the point? I mean, your client made a choice at the time as to what the cure would be.

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, generally speaking, postpetition interest isn't payable until all general unsecured claims have been paid in full.

THE COURT: No, I understand that, but under 365(b) it doesn't talk about post-petition interest. It has (b)(1)(A) which is the provision for curing of a default and then (b)(1)(B) says "... compensates or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly compensate a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease for any actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default." Isn't that the

calculation you go through when you are a nondebtor party to a contract that's being assumed, as well as, of course, adequate assurance. I mean, it's sort of a three-part test. That's your -- you can say I object. You have to comply with those three parts. If you don't you can't assume my contract, but it sounds like your client did that. Your client went through that analysis and agreed on the assumption, and there was a payment, and this seems to me that it would be -- that it's barred by res judicata and the law of the case. I mean, it's already happened. This isn't a claim. It's a cured contract, part of the assumption.

MR. SULLIVAN: Right. But even administrative claims, even if it were treated as administrative claim and not a general unsecured claim, although pursuant to --

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, there's still a claim for post-

THE COURT: But it's not a claim. It's been paid.

petition interest. It's only been paid in part.

THE COURT: But where's -- I don't -- but once it was -- the claim is pursuant to the contract that's been assumed. I mean, once it's assumed then unless you have some other agreement on how the cure is to be paid you just look to perform it's going forward. Have they defaulted post-assumption?

MR. SULLIVAN: It's not -- that's not the issue here,

Your Honor. I don't know if they defaulted or not. I assume that they haven't because, you know --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN: -- that's not part of our pleading.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Does the debtor have anything to say on this objection?

MR. BUTLER: Well, I mean, I know Your Honor hit the salient points. One, this was an assumption back in 2006. It's been assumed all the assumption obligations were by admission performed. I will say generally the debtor's position under this plan in this case is that -- and we have discussed this in several other hearings, there is a difference between cure under Section 365, which -- and the payment of the prepetition claim that is still a claim under a bankruptcy plan.

In this case, people who are being paid cash amounts or cure claims in cash are not receiving post-petition interest and people who chose to not -- to be treated as a class 1C, general unsecured claim, receive plan currency, which incl -- and got post-petition interest, but had received plan currency.

Here, Timken which had already had its contract assumed and had all -- the debtors had already fully performed in connection with that assumption is now coming in after the fact, should be barred to do that as a matter

of res judicata, but they also want sort of a hybrid treatment. They want to keep the cash they were given, and they want to be paid additional post-petition interest, but not take the plan currency the other parties are taking. There isn't any basis for this objection whatsoever, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I agree with that. The Bankruptcy Code treats executory contracts differently than claims. Executory contracts are both assets and liabilities for a debtor and they're -- because of that and because of the balance that Congress struck, nonparties to executory contracts are treated differently than those with simple claims.

If a contract is assumed, those parties are preferred. They -- as Second Circuit in Klinesly [ph.] said, have not only the right to require compliance with 365(b)(1) through (A), (B) and (C), which requires cure or adequate assurance, a prompt cure compensation for actual pecuniary loss and adequate assurance of future performance, but they also get ongoing performance as if the bankruptcy hadn't happened to their contract. If the debtor breaches after assumption, they have an administrative claim.

All of those features are different than the treatment of someone with a prepetition claim or a party

to a contract that's rejected. Here where Timken's contract was assumed, apparently by agreement, the cure payment paid and the other factors of 365(b)(1) satisfied, I think that there's no additional claim that Timken has as a prepetition claim in respect of that contract. If the debtor breaches the contract or has breached it postassumption, it has an administrative claim, but there's no suggestion that it does have one.

So I don't see a basis for an argument that a cure claim that has been satisfied should be put in a class of prepetition claims or has consequently any right to be treated like prepetition claims. It's just -- it's really apples and oranges, so I'll deny this objection.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Counsel for the securities law plaintiffs and the like, both counsel, we're clear in their objections, I think. At least I thought they were clear. I think they were clear earlier today that their concern is really a timing concern.

In other words, as long as the MDL settlement order of this court is entered before a confirmation order, then your concern about the release provisions in the confirmation order goes by the boards, because the MDL order with its own release language is entered before the

effective date. Is that right?

MALE SPEAKER: That's essentially correct, Your
Honor, the --

THE COURT: All right. So why don't we --

MALE SPEAKER: Along with the confirmation of a plan embodying the settlement, so --

THE COURT: So why don't we put this off until the end of this hearing because it may be rendered moot at that point?

MALE SPEAKER: We're hopeful of that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I know you won't, but don't let me forget this point, but I think your objection for the record is clear -- I'm looking at both of you -- that you don't need the extra language that you all propose if it turns out that I approve the MDL settlement and enter that order ahead of the confirmation order.

MALE SPEAKER: As well as entering an order ultimately confirming the plan which embodies the settlement.

THE COURT: Well, of course. Of course. They're tied together.

MALE SPEAKER: That's --

THE COURT: It just is a timing matter. If I approve both, the MDL one has to get entered first.

MALE SPEAKER: That's absolutely correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And I think given the parties' careful drafting it's better to wait so that that can happen as opposed to doing some redrafting now.

MALE SPEAKER: That's absolutely -- it's our hope that it's ultimately rendered moot, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. All right. Is anyone else present or on the phone who wants to argue their objection to the plan? Yes.

MR. FOX: I was waiting to see if there were other individual objections that were -- needed to go forward. Edward Fox, Your Honor, on behalf of Wilmington Trust Company.

Your Honor, this is an important issue which can be dealt with with the passage of two business days, but it's nevertheless important. I think it needs to be seriously considered. As we stand here today according to the deposition and other testimony in the debtor's case, the debtor does not have yet a loan commitment for the -- I guess it's 4.5 billion of exit financing that it is seeking and requires as part of its plan to exit bankruptcy.

It is in the process of getting that. As far as we know, the debtor is doing whatever is necessary or appropriate to do that. We understand that. We accept that. The timing is such that the -- Mr. Sheehan has

indicated in his deposition testimony that commitments are not expected until the 23rd, which is next Wednesday.

That means that if the hearing -- evidentiary portion of the hearing completes tomorrow, Monday is a holiday, there's two business days, Tuesday and Wednesday, before the commitments are supposed to come in.

in. If they don't come in by Wednesday, but they're delayed, we'll at least find out why -- what further update as you asked Mr. Sheehan might be going on that is holding him up, but it's possible that they don't come in with the -- under the appropriate interest cap, which is required under EPCA [Ph.], or that they're delayed significantly given the continued turmoil in the credit markets, which I think we well know about from this case, from the inability to obtain the financing that was originally intended under the plan filed on September 6th, and the issues that we've discussed in this case throughout the fall.

In Mr. Sheehan's deposition testimony, he was asked on page 230 --

THE COURT: But can I interrupt you?

MR. FOX: Yes.

THE COURT: The debtors say, and I think based on my reading of the plan this is correct, the plan will not go

effective, distributions will not be made to anybody unless the exit financing closes.

MR. FOX: That --

THE COURT: And that that's not waivable by anybody.

MR. FOX: Well, that's true. A couple of points, though. First of all, what the statute requires is not that the plan not become effective but that the plan not be confirmed if there's a likelihood of a need for further reorganization, which is why --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. FOX: -- in a case law typically --

THE COURT: But I'm trying to figure out what the -the case law talks about speculative success of the
reorganization. The statute talks about not likely to be
followed by liquidation or the need for financial
reorganization. As a practical matter, I'm just trying to
figure out given that the plan wouldn't go effective
unless you had the financing what is the harm of having it
be confirmed subject to that condition?

MR. FOX: Well, one thing is there's no -- on a practical level, there's no sunset provision in the confirmation order, so if they don't get the financing -- it's true, they don't go effective, but it's not clear that there's any particular date by which the confirmation order becomes null and void and the parties go back to

whatever position they're in.

Now, when the disclosure statement went out, one of the changes that was made that we asked for was to say that the debtors believed that at the present time, and we asked that the words "at the present time" be added, that this is the best plan available.

It's possible that the capital markets could get worse, of course. It's possible that they might get better and certainly predictions had been that we go out a few months that could be the case, but people voted today or by last week with a certain expectation I would suggest to you that they took the plan with some resignation.

THE COURT: And I understand and there's the interest provision that cuts off interest at the end of January.

MR. FOX: Well, that's true, too. So if they don't get their financing but the plan is confirmed, we don't know -- certainly there's no drop-dead date as to how long it would get stretched out, what kind of negotiation might be attempted, you know, with the plan investors or otherwise, what potential adjustments might be made. It creates a whole host of problems and opens up a whole Pandora's box.

THE COURT: But on the other hand, the debtors are fiduciaries.

MR. FOX: Yes, and as good fiduciaries --

THE COURT: And there is an ability to terminate exclusivity.

MR. FOX: Well, they're going to do their best to put a deal together, but there's a deal on the table that people have agreed to with a certain level of expectation. It's with no sunset provision in the confirmation order.

THE COURT: But wasn't there also an expectation that we might well get to confirmation before there was a financing commitment or the like and, in fact, having a confirmed plan subject only to that condition to go -- well, it's not the only condition, but that's the prime condition for going effective, might well have a positive effect on the financing.

MR. FOX: Well, I would certainly have no problem if the order -- and if Your Honor entered a confirmation order that said that it's the -- the confirmation order was subject to their having a financing commitment.

In other words, we're not -- I'm not suggesting that they can't make the rest of their case, that Your Honor can't indicate that you're prepared to confirm the plan subject only to their having the signed commitment letters.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FOX: There's no intention to try to hold the debtor up and that presumably would be helpful if that's

what's required. It seems to me that the two business days does, in effect, and there are many time lines. I can't remember them as well as I'm sure Mr. Butler.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not -- I don't like the two business day argument, I'm afraid.

MR. FOX: Well, even if it's not that, the problem is then --

THE COURT: I understand your point about -- the general point, though. I understand that point.

MR. FOX: There's simply no drop-dead as to what happens.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I -- that's not the point I'm that fond of either. The point I understand is there is a risk to parties of interest of delay beyond what parties might have thought would be appropriate without knowing what that date would be necessarily.

MR. FOX: I believe that's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, from --

THE COURT: And also that it might be entirely hypothetical.

MR. FOX: And we'll presumably know that on Wednesday.

MR. BUTLER: No. I think that's just plain wrong and
I'm -- you know, Mr. Fox -- it's interesting. Mr. Fox is

the only -- I think only party now pressing a feasibility objection at this confirmation hearing after the indentured trustee was supposedly looking after bondholders have now voted in favor of the plan.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you, though, a question, Mr. Butler, and I appreciate that point. But I have had -- I inherited a plan which unfortunately had no end to it, no end to its condition. That was a problem. I eventually dealt with it by a motion under 60(b) and maybe that's what will eventually happen here.

MR. ROSENBERG: Well, Your Honor, if I may this is still an issue of great concern to the Committee and I know you said you'll deal with it in the order, but that is what we're now talking about. We have asked for the placement of a sunset provision in the order. Mr. Butler has refused and we'll be arguing that to you, but, you know, this is a situation where you've got specific dropdead dates and other agreements, but you can have a confirmation order that is absolutely incapable of being consummated. You know, under the Bankruptcy Code a confirmed plan after an appeal period is only challengeable for fraud for a 180-day period. We could be sitting here for months and months and months, but no reason.

Now, you know, whether or not this goes -- becomes a

feasibility issue today, whether or not there's a confirmation order entered subject to feasibility it just can't be that a confirmation order is entered today, the plan becomes clearly unfeasible either because of the financing or because of the passage of time and everyone's just hanging out there. That's just not appropriate and I'm sort of interested and happy to hear that Your Honor has had some experience with that. It shouldn't happen in this case.

MR. BUTLER: On the other hand, Your Honor, we're here at confirmation and I recognize Mr. Rosenberg's view that, you know -- and they are the Creditors' Commission is a fiduciary, but the reality is until a draft comment we got from last night they had never raised the issue of a sunset provision in this which we would have resisted had they ever raised it.

THE COURT: I -- as I said to Mr. Fox, the sunset provision concept to me doesn't seem to work because I don't think the parties considered a sunset provision, but they did consider this happening with the financing.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I think one of the things we --

THE COURT: And -- I'm sorry. Maybe you're about to say this, but an order that says the plan is confirmed subject to a commitment at which point this order becomes

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effective is -- I don't know. What do you think about that?

MR. BUTLER: I really hope Your Honor doesn't do that. I think it adds -- it adds conditionality and uncertainty into an extraordinarily uncertain market.

THE COURT: Well, but it's the same condition not only that's there, because they know the plan won't be consummated without the financing. I don't think --

MR. BUTLER: I'm not even sure that's a confirmation order that's enforceable under the EPCA. My point is we're here at confirmation to get -- to procure an order, which I believe on this record we're entitled to get and which we then follow what the plan says. This plan was approved by 80 percent of the people who voted on it. The reality is that there is very specifically a series of conditions to the effective date. If we look on Exhibit 95, page 7, this was the chart that was in the disclosure statement and again shall be talking about later, but reminding Your Honor of the events we have to navigate through over the next couple of months starting at the end of February, and then going into March and April, and things -- you know, and it's not until April frankly that, you know, there are some termination rights that are optional termination rights in March. ADH has a termination right that comes up at the end of March, but

it's not all the plan investors. It's ADH.

GM has some rights to trigger, some in March, some at the end of April. The Government has rights at the end of February. We're in a very uncertain market here and the debtors need the opportunity and the flexibility to navigate through this marketplace and to get to a point where we can get the EPCA closed, the GSA closed, and financing consummated and closed that will allow us to effectuate these distributions.

The reality is, we have never committed -- and I
don't know of anything in the plan and disclosure
statement or anything we've ever committed to that says
that we were going to have the financing all completed by
the confirmation --

THE COURT: No, you have it. That's why I think a drop-dead date doesn't make sense. I agree with that.

MR. BUTLER: And, Your Honor, as we go through there --

THE COURT: If on the other hand you never get --

MR. BUTLER: -- if you look at condition 12 --

THE COURT: -- the finan -- I mean, this is all hypothetical.

MR. BUTLER: Right.

THE COURT: Let me -- what -- is what you were saying is that there are other transactional termination dates

that will likely to be triggered if you don't get the financing?

MR. BUTLER: Yes. And I'm also saying, Your Honor, that we need the opportunity. We could all go back to square one if that's what people want to do in this case at some point. I know I certainly don't. I want to try to get the deal --

THE COURT: I don't think --

MR. BUTLER: -- that the creditors have voted on --

THE COURT: -- I don't think the indentured trustee wants to do that either, nor Mr. Rosenberg. I think they were concerned about open-endedness. Your response is there are likely termination triggers here.

MR. BUTLER: There are ten triggers -- ten effective date requirements in Section 12.2 of the plan that's been voted on by creditors and there are a series and my view is that the governors on all of that are GM, in the GM, in the GM and GSA and MRA and the plan investors in EPCA. I want to be very plain --

THE COURT: And the debtors.

MR. BUTLER: And the debtors. But I want to be very plain on this, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the debtors are fiduciaries.

MR. BUTLER: Are fiduciaries. We're going to do everything we can if Your Honor confirms this plan to get

it to go effective as quickly as we can get it to go effective. But, you know, if we're going -- once the confirmation order is entered, we then execute a rights offering, you know, we're going to be working on the financing. Hopefully the financing will come together. You heard Mr. Sheehan's testimony today that there wasn't any material change in his judgment as to the ability to procure the financing, but these are uncertain markets and uncertain times, and we want the ability to be able to manage all the levers dealing with the EPCA, the GSA, the MRA financing to get that package to all come together. We would -- we intentionally have not ever come before this court or the parties and pointed to a specific date as to when that's going to occur. We've said publicly until frankly this hearing -- we've said publicly that we hope that would happen by the end of the first quarter. The reality is is I think people know we're trying to do our best to see if that can come together prior to any of these event risks occurring starting at the end of February.

That's going to be a function of being able to put the financing together. Certainly if the debtors as fiduciaries came to the conclusion that we could not execute on this plan that the plan -- that the plan notwithstanding everyone's best -- good faith and best

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intentions the debtors as fiduciaries aren't going to sit around for months and months or days or weeks and not do anything. I don't think there's any record of us sitting on our hands here. We've been extremely proactive in this case.

But I'm looking to maximize the opportunity for success here. Assuming the debtors meet their evidentiary burdens and are able to get a confirmation order what maximizes this is for us to be able to go in the marketplace and be able to be very clear that this case is essentially done. All right. This case is cooked. Here are -- everything is done. The order is final. We're moving on with the rights offering. We're implementing the plan and that everyone understands what we need to do with respect to financing and the EPCA and the GSA.

It's very clear that, you know, we -- the rights that people have to affect those conditions are set forth in the plan and it's very clear that we have to adhere to those, but I think there's been a carefully negotiated balance in 12.2 and 12.3 about what can be done and when it can be done and by whom. We simply want to be absolutely sure that we are able to maximize the opportunity to get that done, so that's why, Your Honor, we think it's -- we believe as the case is pointed out in our response on pages 61 through 63 of our brief indicated

we believe that we have been able to demonstrate feasibility. We believe that Your Honor is not precluded certainly in this district from concluding based on the uncontroverted evidence in the record that the company given the fact this is a condition to the effective date that the company can take into account the effective date transactions in determining feasibility.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FOX: Your Honor, I think at this point I need to make a clean record on this because I'm very disturbed by what Mr. Butler has said and what the implication is of what he's said.

First of all, the time line that he put up was the time line that was used in the disclosure statement to tell people all the bad things that would happen if they didn't vote for the plan because if the debtor didn't meet these deadlines their deal with the PBGC would fall apart, their deal on the EPCA would fall apart, the deal with the unions might fall apart, et cetera, et cetera.

In other words, it wasn't to suggest to people that only those deadlines were the deadlines that would save them from being stuck in limbo forever.

THE COURT: But there's no other deadline.

MR. FOX: No, no.

THE COURT: There's no deadline.

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MR. FOX: But hear me out, because what those deadlines were put in to tell people that this had to get done now, because if it didn't get done now and it didn't get done before February 29th that in effect the economics could change, the parade of horribles would kick in, and something worse would happen than what we have now.

People made a decision based in part presumably on the fact that at present this was (a) the best deal they were going to get, and (b) that if they didn't take it now worse things would happen in the future.

What Mr. Butler is now saying is that people actually, you know, were looking at the -- were supposed to look at these time lines to think that they were going to have to suffer through these deadlines and only if other parties, the PBGC, the UAW, et cetera, called triggers would somehow this thing fall apart, because that presumably would then trigger the EPCA and let the plan investors walk away.

THE COURT: But what else --

MR. FOX: That's what --

THE COURT: What else would you think?

MR. FOX: I would think that the Court would not enter a confirmation order if it weren't satisfied that the debtor was going to be -- had its financing, which is typically the case when the debtor comes to confirmation.

Now, Mr. Butler also, I think, basically made the argument against what his own -- what he claims his own witness said in terms of --

THE COURT: Well, I have -- well, okay. Go ahead.

MR. FOX: He's arguing against the factual statements or the opinion of his own witness about the financing.

What he stood here and said was that we're in extraordinarily uncertain markets. That's all the more reason not to credit the testimony in the declaration or the opinion of Mr. Sheehan and it's nothing against

Mr. Sheehan. He's working as hard as he can. We appreciate that, but it just points to the fact that anybody sitting here can't predict what's going to happen in the markets and whether the debtor can get the financing. We hope that they will. We're not trying to, you know, do something to prevent them from doing that, but having a confirmation order that's completely openended leaves the creditors in limbo and creates a real problem.

Secondly, if you look at the testimony of Mister -the deposition testimony of Mr. Sheehan, for instance,
when he was asked about the schedule, he was asked on page
240, "When is the earliest you think you will have
commitment for the full financing?" Answer, "The current
time schedule would call for a January 23rd due date for

commitments and JPM is working toward that exactly, but, you know, to be open it is a very tough market and we're working as hard as we can."

He was then asked, "Do you think it is a slam dunk?"

Answer, "I don't think anybody in this market would call
it a slam dunk."

He was asked -- let's see -- on page 287, "First, do you have a view as to how likely it is that the company will be able to obtain the exit financing of these under the plan at a price that it can afford?" Objection by Mr. Hogue and asked and answered, but you can discuss it again. Answer, "The company was -- the company announced earlier this week, I'm sure you're aware, we discussed at the statutory committee meeting last week that we reduced our exist financing by 675 million. I think that helps dramatically to assure or helps dramatically to be able to stay under the 585 cap and, you know, only time will tell."

And then he was asked a question, "It helps, although I believe you testified earlier that you still wouldn't say it was slam dunk in the current credit market. Is that correct?" Answer, "I'm not sure I was testifying about the probability of staying under 585. I think with respect to the 'slam dunk' comment it was more about the ability to get the financing done, but maybe I'm wrong. I

don't think anything is a slam dunk in this market."

So anyway, the point is we're going to have -- as Mr. Rosenberg's points out to me, we're also -- if they go forward and the confirmation order is entered, a rights offering is going to get triggered. You're going to have people not only have to putting up money or trading rights in the marketplace, because these are going to trade. If people don't want to exercise them, they're freely tradeable and people have the ability to buy them, we're going to have a situation where people are going to be buying rights on the market on a plan that may never become effective. It creates extraordinary problems in that circumstance.

The debtor is basically arguing that the creditors have voted for an open-ended period of limbo that they should merely trust the debtors to try and get done whatever they can whenever they can get it done. I don't think that's (a) what anybody bargained for, but I don't think that's what the Code permits. The Court has to make a determination now as to whether confirmation, not effectiveness, but confirmations is likely to be followed by further reorganization. With the debtor's counsel standing here talking about the extraordinarily uncertain markets, I don't know how you can make that determination and sign a confirmation order before we have the

commitments.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, a couple of points. I

know -- I think you dealt with the drop-dead date. I'll

just reiterate my comment that I think that Mr. Fox's

pursuit of that actually damages the debtors and the right

to get this plan done. Put -- entering drop-dead dates I

think would be completely counter-productive. I'd also

point out that the company never represented to anyone as

to the exact date and time this financing would be

completed and there's nothing in the record that Mr. Fox

just read that would suggest to the contrary.

The evidence in Mr. Sheehan's testimony has been very consistent in terms of what we're trying to get accomplished. We're trying to get this done yesterday, you know, and the questions that Mr. Fox said, what's the earliest something that happened. We're trying to get it done yesterday.

On the other hand, we haven't said if it doesn't get done tomorrow we should go back to square one. The reality is I've always believed the case law to be that we have to demonstrate here in connection -- and when you talk about confirmation of the plan will not lead to another financial organization, I've always paid attention to Texaco, which has -- and some of the other cases which has been pretty clear that we're required to establish at

the confirmation hearing that at the emergence of the debtors from Chapter 11 there's at least a reasonable prospect that the debtor's earning capacity, together with their ability to obtain financing and sell assets will be sufficient to fund the plan. It's as of the -- you know, that is -- in terms of taking the plan effective and I have always understood the case to be that so long as things are -- you know, so long as the debtor's business plan is not so --

THE COURT: The Court makes the determination, not the lenders.

MR. BUTLER: Correct. You know, and the fact of the matter is that Your Honor gets to take into consideration this business plan as it's been presented in the evidentiary record and all of the aspects of the company's restructuring. The EPCA and the very settlements and the plan -- and I think Your Honor gets to take judicial notice of Your Honor's prior order approving the financing arrangements, albeit the structure of them, the arranger's agreements, not the committed financing, but that is a final order of this court.

THE COURT: I guess the answer to Mr. Fox's point about the rights offering is if -- is that if the plan does not go effective, the rights offering is null and void.

MR. BUTLER: That's correct.

THE COURT: So it's not as if the debtor keeps that money.

MR. BUTLER: We don't keep any of it. I think Mr.

Fox's point is that people may sell out in the marketplace and they sell it in the marketplace that -- in those market transactions. That's a -- I don't know what those trades will be and what those agreements will be, but presumably I'm assuming that if someone buys rights that they later can't exercise they will have some ability to go back against the seller. I'm not -- that's not for us to be concerned about. We're not setting up those arrangements. They are whatever the marketplace will provide them in the context of the order everybody reads, but the Court -- let's make no mistake. The Court is ordering these things will be mattered.

I believe under Texaco that we have been able to -we have made the showing that -- I believe the case law in
this circuit and district requires that we make on this
evidentiary record. I don't think there's anything in our
plan that suggests or anyone could walk away from our plan
believing that this company could be sitting around the
kind -- the length of period or anywhere close to what
Your Honor is dealing with in that other case. I just
think that's it.

But to put constraints on the debtor, start putting one arm behind our back because a single objector here whose constituency is voted for the plan says what we should do here is put constrictions on the debtor's ability to try to take this plan effective, I think that is not in the best interests of the estate and the objection should be overruled.

MR. FOX: Your Honor, with respect to the rights offering point, this is a serious point. People may be able to make arrangements with respect to the sale or rights but one of two things are going to happen, because there's only a 20-day window to either exercise or trade the rights. Sure, if you exercise the rights then presumably -- and the plan doesn't become effective the rights are going to go -- the money goes back to the purchaser, but it certainly seems to me that either you won't be able to sell your rights at all or you're going to sell them and have to buy them back effectively if the plan doesn't become effective, but at the end of the 20-day period, which is going to start, if there's no financing the plan doesn't become effective then the rights become worthless.

So people are being told they're going to get rights that are 22 percent of their recovery and they'll effectively expire worthless one way or the other if

there's no financing in place or they'll be severely discounted if they can sell them without having the obligation to take them back, but either way it kills the value that people were told they were going to have with respect to these rights. You can't say you've got a limited window of time but this event you weren't told about because we couldn't get financing --

THE COURT: That's what I don't -- I guess --

MR. FOX: Well, when does the 20-day period --

MR. BUTLER: Mr. Fox is just completely misrepresenting this plan.

THE COURT: Yeah, I -- there's no date that people could rely upon in the plan. If you put a sunset provision in, you wouldn't have that issue either.

MR. FOX: Well, people are going to have the 20-day period from some point in February, if I understand it correctly, to ex --

THE COURT: No, but what I'm saying is if you put in a sunset provision for the financing then that wouldn't affect -- that wouldn't improve anyone's position. It would just make it worse as far as the rights offering is concerned.

MR. FOX: Well, what it would mean is you wouldn't go forward with the rights offering because you'd recognize the impact that the failure to have the financing by that

time would have on the rights offering otherwise you're saying, let's go forward with the rights offering but we don't have the financing. You don't know -- you talk about uncertainty in the marketplace and the affect that it has on the value of the rights and on the recovery, that's going to have a severe impact if not a complete impact on the value of the rights. That time period isn't going to be delayed. Maybe Mr. Butler could tell me otherwise, but I don't believe that that time period is intended to be delayed until they get the -- have the financing commitments.

So you have a process working in tandem, but one is going to be affected by the other. The rights that people told that they were going to get and were going to have value, I think we should be able to all agree are going to be severely affected by the lack of the financing because the market is going to know that.

MR. BUTLER: And this is the problem I have with these hypothetical debates in public about Mr. Fox's concerns about what may or may no occur when, in fact, you know, the reality here is the financing. Assuming we're able in the very short term to get the circle commitments from the book and get the book -- the orders in on the book of financing, the reality is the documentation all has to be worked out and finalized and everyone circles

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around that. We all understand how these syndicates get put together. That process is going to happen during the time and was always planned over the last number of weeks to be during the time whenever -- when we made the decision last to do the launch after the first of the year that was always going to go along with all the activities necessary to get to the effective date and there is nothing in the planned disclosure statement to suggest otherwise. The goal -- at least the company's goal here obviously is to move forward expeditiously. I think no one is suggesting that we aren't. If we can pull all the levers together successfully, we'll be out before the first of those event risks occurs, become effective. All I'm saying is if we can't do that, the debtors I think in this plan bargained for the ability to try to manage those event risks as fiduciaries in a way that allows the debtors to implement the plan.

But ultimately if the plan cannot be implemented the debtors and fiduciaries know what they have to do. We'll be back before this court and we'll be back with the committees, but I -- but to constrict the debtors, particularly when I think we have met the standards and met the case law that's described in detail in our brief, complied with it, and we've -- and, you know, I'll remind everyone this is a preponderance of the evidence burden we

have at the confirmation hearing and the evidence is uncontroverted. You know, Your Honor, I believe that we've met the standard and that these -- this objection should be overruled.

THE COURT: All right. Section 1129(a)(11) provides that "The Court shall not enter an order confirming the plan if" -- and this is a quote -- "confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation or the need for further financial reorganization of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan."

Wilmington Trust as indentured trustee for one of the issuances of bonds under -- that the debtor -- the parent debtor has issued has raised the objection that the present status of the debtor's exit financing arrangements requires the Court not to confirm the plan today or tomorrow or enter an order doing so until the exit financing is confirmed by a signed commitment.

The record as set forth primarily in Mr. Sheehan's declaration but it's also a matter of record in the case is that the debtors have entered into a best efforts agreement with Citi Group and JPMorgan as lead arrangers and that those parties starting earlier this month began to assemble as soon as they get potential lenders with

respect to the exit financing.

Mr. Sheehan testified that the earliest date when that commitment would issue would be the middle of next week, but he could not confirm that it would be a "slam dunk," which is something that I would expect any accountant to say.

The other evidence in the record with respect to the exit financing is evidence with regard to the debtor's business plan as vetted by PWC and which serves the basis for a very substantial financial commitments by the plan investors led by Appaloosa.

The provision of the Code that I quoted, 1129(a)(11), does not specify how the Court determines whether the plan is not likely to be followed by the need for further financial reorganization. I do not believe that the Court under the present circumstances needs to defer making that analysis until third parties have acted to sign commitment letters, but that rather the Court can make such a determination based on the present record.

I also believe that as Mr. Butler correctly states while the burden generally for the proponent of a plan is a preponderance of the evidence burden, the showing that the proponent needs to make under Section 1129(a)(11) is pretty clearly set forth by the language, i.e., it is not likely to be followed by the need for further financial

reorganization.

I cannot make that -- I cannot find anything other than that conclusion. It is not likely to be followed by further financial reorganization based on today's record. I believe that based upon the undertakings by Citi Group and JPMorgan, based upon the debtor's business plan as vetted by its professionals including PWC and by outside third parties and its financials indicate that it could can well support the exit financing. I appreciate that it is conceivable that notwithstanding the abundance of capital in the world that prospective lenders may for matters completely unrelated to the debtor for some reason think that normal credit analyses don't apply for the month of January 2008, but that's not anywhere set forth in the record.

I have to assume that lenders who are in the business of lending money to make money will look at a company like Delphi, look at its ability to repay debt, and look at what it's achieved through its reorganization plan, and conclude that it makes economic sense to provide the exit financing. I believe furthermore that that is why in part parties in interest voted on this plan, which did not contemplate a drop-dead date for the exit financing, per se, but instead contemplate a series of closely interlocked transactions. In particular, the GM

settlement, the union agreements, and the plan funding agreement, the EPCA that are premised upon a later date and time essentially the end of March and that the parties were prepared in light of that not to have a specific sunset provision.

I believe it is also the case that the parties who voted in favor of this plan would find themselves prejudiced by imposing such a date. That is so I believe particularly because based on what's before me in the record, it seems to me that issues with regard to the exit financings being available are tied less to, if at all to, the debtor's inherent economic strength and ability to repay that financing, but rather to rather nebulous issues related to perhaps irrational lack of confidence on lenders' behalf generally in the marketplace putting a condition now that would limit confirmation's effect into the plan or the confirmation order or delaying entry of that order I think would encourage that what appears to me to be irrational propensity.

I don't believe given that it wasn't in the plan or the disclosure statement that parties would be well served by imposing it now and, in fact, might be concerned that it would be imposed now. As I said during oral argument on this point, I do have some concern based on experience in a wholly different case where I had an irresponsible

debtor in front of me, unlike here, that a confirmation order not be entered with an undue delay between confirmation and effectiveness. However, here the debtors have made it abundantly clear that they are proceeding as fast as they possibly can to emerge from Chapter 11.

In addition, there are logical decision dates in the other transactions that I described and it seems to me that the debtors acting as fiduciaries can be relied upon not to hold the creditors hostage in a hypothetical situation unless the case I remember, and if for some unforeseen reason they do something like that, there's an appropriate remedy for creditors.

Consequently, I conclude that the plan is feasible under Section 1129(a)(11) and that there should not be imposed on the terms of the plan an additional date that the parties did not have before them when they were voting on it tied to when exit financing should, in fact, be permitted or alternatively there should not be a condition to confirmation itself of receiving exit financing commitments.

I believe that in sum as I have done those voting on the plan look at the debtors' underlying business and financial fundamentals and made their analysis that the plan would be feasible and that they would receive the recoveries that they assume they will receive under the

69 1 plan and that a part of that analysis is that the relevant 2 group of prospective or potential lenders will do the 3 same. 4 I think that was the last objection where someone was 5 represented in court. If not, you should speak up now or 6 else we'll turn to the other objections that are 7 remaining. Okay. 8 Do you just want to go down them in order, 9 Mr. Butler? 10 MR. BUTLER: I thought I would, if that's all right, 11 Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. BUTLER: I think the -- I'll just get myself --14 just one moment so I can get organized. 15 All right. Your Honor, the -- just get my individual 16 objections here. 17 Your Honor, the first two objections that I would 18 deal with are the objections of Cheryl Carter (ph.). 19 These are at 11753 and 11806. 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. BUTLER: Ms. Carter wrote --22 THE COURT: No, I've read the objections. 23 MR. BUTLER: Okay. 24 THE COURT: There --25 MR. BUTLER: Do you want me to address them, Your

Honor, or --

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THE COURT: Why don't you address them just briefly? MR. BUTLER: All right. In objection 11753 Ms. Carter -- both objections, they object to the parties' treatment under the plan. She's objecting to the plan. The fact that we filed Chapter 11, that we were reorganizing and that employees were laid off. We have treated this in our response as an objection to the parties' treatment under the plan. I would simply argue, Your Honor, that while a party may not support their treatment, the plan as a whole has been accepted by the requisite classes. The more -- just as importantly, the memorandum of understanding with the applicable unions are now the subject of final orders of this court and they stand for the transactions that have been agreed to there and objections to provisions in those agreements are now moot having been dealt with if they were timely raised at the time those agreements were approved by the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. I agree. The two generalized objections that Ms. Carter made are ones that are overcome in the first instance by the accepting vote of the class in which her claim resides, secondly, by the agreement with the union to which I believe she is a member, although it's not clear entirely from the objection.

In any event, there's no particularized or specific

objection beyond that rather amorphous objection that she does not like the plan and consequently I'll overrule the objection.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the next -- I believe the next objection that we've not dealt with is 11811. This is a letter objection dated January 7, 2008 from Darla and Allen Schmidt (ph.). In this objection they objected to the treatment of Delphi stock under the plan. It's a seven-page handwritten letter. Again, our response to this if this is treated as an objection to a particular treatment under the plan in this case the -- while they may not individually support the treatment, the plan as a whole and the class in which they would be considered has accepted the plan under the statutory requirements 1129.

THE COURT: I agree with that. The class vote has mooted their objection or alternatively they don't have standing to make that objection based on the class vote.

I also conclude since there are some references in the letter to Mr. Schmidt's prior employment by GM that the GM settlement, which is part of the plan, would override that objection given my belief that that settlement is in the best interests of the debtor's estate and fair and equitable.

Therefore, that -- to the extent that I can

understand Mr. Schmidt's objection with regard to his prior ownership of stock that it was based upon issues between the debtors and GM that that objection is not well taken given the merits of the GM settlement in the plan.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

The next objection to be dealt with is objection

11812. This is the objection of Frank X. Budelewski

spelled B-U-D-E-L-E-W-S-K-I. This is a two-page letter

objection in which Mr. Budelewski objects to the pension

plan described in the plan on several bases. He asserts

age discrimination because retirees of the age 65 is

entitled to cash while retirees under that age he asserts

is not entitled to it. He asserts because he worked for

General Motors for over 30 years his pension plan should

not have been transferred to Delphi upon separation.

Again, Your Honor, from the debtor's perspective and legally responding to this letter objection, we believe this is an objection again to the party's treatment under the plan and that the class in which he would be classified has voted to accept the plan.

THE COURT: I agree with that, again, because of the class vote. The issues raised by Mr. Budelewski are not ones that need to be addressed under 1129(b)(1) --

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I don't mean to interrupt, but I was just passed a note that literally as we were

73 1 arguing this objection Mr. Budelewski resolved his 2 objection --3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. BUTLER: -- I'm told to place that on the record. 5 THE COURT: Very well. So it's moot for that reason, 6 too. 7 [Laughter.] 8 MR. BUTLER: I wouldn't normally interrupt the Court, 9 but I know Your Honor doesn't like to --10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. BUTLER: -- rule if a settlement has been 12 reached. It occurred as we were speaking. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. BUTLER: The next objection, Your Honor, is 15 objection 11822 and this is also 12016. There are two 16 objections and this was from -- just get them -- this is 17 from Randy Halazon, H-A-L-A-Z-O-N. I believe this -- just 18 to say it, they were filed in different ways, but I 19 believe the two objections are, in fact, identical. At 20 least my information would suggest they are under two 21 docket numbers. 22 One was, I think, it was received in two different 23 places, one at Delphi, and one in the Bankruptcy Court,

places, one at Delphi, and one in the Bankruptcy Court, and they were docketed separately for that reason. This was an objection by Mr. Halazon to -- made several

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objections. I think some -- one we dealt with today and one you may not want to deal with until tomorrow.

The first objection was as a former employee of Delphi he asserts the plan is unfair and inequitable to the extent it doesn't include the foreign subsidiaries as part of the liquidation analysis. That happens as a factual matter not to be true. The liquidation analysis assumes the going concern sale of the remaining nondebtor businesses which are located primarily outside of the United States, that's how value gets to Dashi, one of the debtor's subsidiaries. It was contemplated, considered. Dashi, I believe, is group two in the liquidation analysis and as part of Exhibit E to the plan or rather the disclosure statement. I think that was, in fact, comprehended and so we'd ask -- so I think the objection, number one, is incorrect and number two the class in which he has -- he would participate has voted in favor of a plan.

His other objection is an objection to management compensation. Your Honor may want to take that up tomorrow.

THE COURT: I'll carry that till tomorrow, but Mr. Halazon's other objection is overruled.

First, it's not clear to me from his objection whether he still has a stock interest. You suggested his

stock was sold by his pension trustee, but in any event, if he has a continuing stock interest, the class has accepted the plan and to the extent he's raising 1129(b)(1) or (b) type objections, I believe that renders his objection of no effect. See, for example, In Re:

Jersey Medical Center, 817 F.2d 1055 (Third Circuit 1987).

As far as his best interest objection is concerned, based on my review of the liquidation analysis the debtors or the particular debtor's equity in the four nondebtor subsidiaries was taken into account. To the extent he suggests that something more than those foreign subsidiaries equity should have been taken into account, that's incorrect since the creditors of those foreign subsidiaries would have first claim on their assets.

MR. BUTLER: All right. Your Honor, the -- thank you, Your Honor. The next objection that I believe we have is 11869, Equistar Chemicals, LP. Equistar seeks to preserve its right of setoff and objects to the plan to the extent it disallows or impairs claims to set off the offset, which allegedly would result in discharge or their secured claim -- their alleged secured claim without providing it with the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim.

Our response to that was that under the terms of the plan secured claims, assuming claims -- including claims

secured by setoff to the extent those claims are ultimately allowed by the Court are paid in full under the plan and, therefore, there is no prejudice to Equistar. There are a series of court-approved procedures both in the case and in the plan about how to exercise setoff rights and so if, in fact, Equistar has a valid setoff right and has preserved it and is ultimately allowed by the Court, the plan will provide for the payment of that claim.

THE COURT: I agree with that based upon my reading of the plan. Consequently, Equistar's concern doesn't legitimately exist so its objection is overruled.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. I think I'm going to have folks help me on this, make sure I haven't missed anything. I think the next one is 12013, Larry Vanderpool (ph.) I think is our next --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BUTLER: Just give me one second, Your Honor, please.

THE COURT: In essence, I guess what I take away from Mr. Vanderpool's objection is he believes in his particular instance the agreement with the union was not honored in some respect.

MR. BUTLER: Well, Your Honor, I think it actually -it may be -- I think it's -- I mean, in some respects

perhaps it's that it may be a bit broader than that. This is a January 5, 2008 two-page letter objection in which I think it does go to the memorandum of understanding, but I -- it's not clear to me that he's asserting the -- that we haven't followed -- that the MOU provides or that the information that was provided in connection with its approval was misleading. It appears to me to be a collateral attack on the memorandum of understanding. At least that's the way I interpreted it.

THE COURT: Well, it may be --

MR. BUTLER: That may not be correct, but --

THE COURT: If it is, then it's barred by the order approving the settlement agreement in respect of the unions in the Kettering, Ohio plant. If it's something less than that and a suggestion that there's been some form of breach of the agreement, I believe the plan has appropriate recognition of a remedy, but it's not really a confirmation objection.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, and beyond that I also -if, in fact, it's -- the allegation has been the debtor
has not performed under the memo of understanding, a
matter of labor law in addition to everything else, the
MOU and labor law has a whole set of procedures including
governance -- grievance procedures that would be
triggered but it would not be -- I mean, that's the other

point I guess I would make. It's hard to kind of sort out what it was.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. In any event, as a plan objection it's without merit. Not to say that there's any merit to it otherwise, but it's really not an objection to any provision of the plan.

Therefore, it's overruled.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the next objection is docket number

12017. This is a two-page letter, but I think it's

actually one page. Two pages have been stapled together

in the way we received it, docket number 12017, Robert W.

Ward. Mr. Ward asserts that he's a shareholder and he's

entitled to the same percentage of ownership and

reorganized Delphi as he had in Delphi before filed his

Chapter 11 petition. It's essentially, I think, a ride
through objection. Think should ride through the Chapter

11. Again, from a legal perspective I think the debtor's

appropriate response to this is that while he may object

to his treatment under the plan, the party in which he

is -- the class in which he has appropriately classified

person has voted in favor of the plan.

THE COURT: I agree with that again because of the acceptance of the interest holder class the valuation issue implicit in Mr. Ward's objection is not an issue

because the class has accepted the plan. Again, see In Re: Jersey City Medical Center, 817 F.2d 1055 at 1062 (Third Circuit 1987).

In addition, and this really goes for all of the objections that I ruled on that are based upon the objector's view that he or she is entitled to greater value under the plan as a shareholder I have reviewed and will rely on Mr. Resnik's (ph.) declaration. Excuse me. As well as Mr. Whitmir's (ph.) declaration and Mr. Sheehan's declaration as to on a -- that the consensual plan value is a reasonable value for purposes of a consensual resolution and for setting the stock price for distribution under the plan.

So for those reasons, the objection is overruled.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the next objection is objection one -- I believe it's 12079, Orville W. Wright (ph.). Mr. Wright asserts that because he worked for General Motors for over 30 years his pension plan should not have been transferred to Delphi upon separation and that his flow-back opportunities to GM should have been better explained to him. I think, Your Honor, whatever that complaint is, it is not, I think, a cognizable objection to confirmation of a plan. Mr. Wright, if he is -- in fact, has stock or has claims it's hard to tell from the document that which --

whichever class he would have been properly classified.

Those classes are voted in favor of the plan and the objection itself is not a cognizable objection to confirmation.

THE COURT: I agree with that and also note that to the extent the objection has implicit in it an objection to the GM settlement that's part of the plan. I conclude based on review of Mr. Step's declaration, as well as Mr. Sheehan's and Mr. Miller's that the GM settlement is again fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the debtor -- the debtors and an appropriate resolution of I believe, although I'm not sure one of Mr. Wright's arguments in his objection that as I take it GM should be responsible for his debts or for his claims.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next objection is docket number 12080 from Keith Miller. Mr. Miller asserts that he was not provided sufficient time to return his ballot because he did not receive it from his proxy in a timely manner. His is a one-page letter objection dated January 9, 2008 and he writes from Granite Bay, California to the Court indicating that his voting package from his proxy agent arrived on January 8, 2008 having come from proxy services in Farmingdale, New York, and then describes the process he did to seek to vote on this.

Your Honor, I -- the responses we have are as

follows. First, the debtor believed that the cessation (ph.) procedures order and the solicitation process approved therein is a sound process. I think as evidenced from the fact that over 217 million shares voted in the equity class on this plan and over 80 percent of the bondholders, the senior notes voted on the plan, I think there is sound evidence in the voting reports Your Honor has already accepted in the record to evidence that the kinds of responses that were received by the voting agents would belie any sort of systemic flaw in the cessation procedures. I don't know this particular circumstances of Mr. Brown's or Mr. Miller's relationship with his proxy agent.

THE COURT: Do you know how much of debt or equity he may hold?

MR. BUTLER: I don't, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: I mean, I don't. I mean, it would need to be a very large amount.

THE COURT: To matter.

MR. BUTLER: To matter in this case.

THE COURT: Certainly it wasn't large enough for him

to appear here.

MR. BUTLER: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I will overrule

this objection first because based upon the voting tabulation in the record it appears to me to be the case that as Mr. Butler noted this plan unlike a lot of plans had a remarkable amount of voting on it, particularly in the category where you would have a proxy agent or broker, i.e., the public bonds and stock. So taking Mr. Miller's objection at its face without any ability to examine him or his agent it appears to me that if he received his ballot late that was a rare aberration.

Secondly, it appears highly likely to me that the lateness of his ballot is moot in that as far as numerocity is concerned the public debt and stock classes voted in favor of the plan whether his vote would be counted or not.

As far as dollar amount would be concerned, his claim would have to be quite high, extremely high to alter the vote and as I just noted he has not appeared or hired a lawyer from which I can -- I believe -- reasonably infer that it is not high, so that objection is overruled.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, the next objection is docket number 12081. This is the objection of the Monroe County Water Authority.

THE COURT: Monroe County?

MR. BUTLER: Excuse me. Monroe County.

THE COURT: Monroe County.

MR. BUTLER: Yeah. Monroe County. Sorry. Monroe

County Water Authority from Rochester, New York. It was

dated -- letter to me dated January 9, 2008 and the -
their complaint here really goes to their treatment under

the plan to the extent that they have -- their claim is an

unsecured claim. They basically indicate that they as a

governmental entity can't really accept the form of

planned currency that's proposed in this case or in fact

it would be a burden on them and they explained in their

letter objection why that is.

So from the debtor's perspective this again is -should, I think, be treated here today in this hearing as
an objection by a creditor to treatment under the plan
which I believe should be overruled by the Court based on
among other matters the class having voted in favor of the
plan.

THE COURT: All right. I also believe arguably this objection was made under 1123(a)(4) and perhaps also under 11 U.S.C. 1122(a), but I don't believe it has merit under either of those sections 1123(a)(4) provides that a plan shall "provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class. Unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment." The operative word there is "claim." "... the same treatment for each claim or interest of a

particular class." Monroe County's claim is being treated the same as every other claim in the class. It is -- I'll take it on faith because Monroe County isn't here to establish it on a contested basis, that Monroe County may have less ability to use or receive that treatment, but I do not believe that's what 1123(a)(4) contemplates as prohibiting disparate treatment.

I also believe the operative word in 1122(a) is also claim as opposed to claimant and again the claim is substantially similar to all other unsecured claims. I also have some question as to whether as a factual matter Monroe County cannot monetize its recovery in some way, shape or form either through selling it or through setting up some form of subsidiary, but that ultimately is neither here nor there given the plain meaning of the statute and the cases which the debtors have cited in their reply memorandum that construe what Congress meant to preclude under 1129 -- I'm sorry, 1123(a)(4) and 1122.

So that objection will be overruled.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I believe the last objection to be dealt with -- there's one other objection I'd like to go back to, but the last objection we've not talked about to be dealt with today I believe is objection number 12083 and that's the objection of Naomi M. Frye, F-R-Y-E.

Ms. Frye filed a letter -- actually, a written objection -- on January 10, 2008 in which she complained about her treatment having purchased General Motors shares in 1950 and ultimately having -- talking about various spinoffs that she would have participated in including the Delphi spinoff in May of 1999 and does not believe the program that is proposed under the plan, in fact, works to her favor and asks that the small investor be protected, that all partial common stock in the corporation be paid proportionately for shares in the amount at the rate of 7193 and that the same protection made the similar shareholders as a class action suit without fees and attorney's fees and costs.

Again, Your Honor, I think as a general response to this objection we would rely on the fact that the class in which Ms. Frye is situated voted in value of the plan and that her objection should be overruled.

THE COURT: Okay. I agree with that for the same reasons that I dealt with similar objections. I'd also note that in light of Mr. Resnik's declaration supplemented by Mr. Sheehan's and Mr. Whitmir's and my review of the GM settlement that, in fact, based upon my assessment of the value of these debtors the interests of small investors like Ms. Frye were, indeed, well represented by the equity committee and to the extent such

investors had securities law claims by the MDL representatives.

So that objection will be overruled.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I'd like, if I could, to go back to the docket number 11883 on page 27 of Exhibit 158 that deals with the Audio MPEG, Inc. objection that's been settled. I'd like to summarize that settlement on the record, if I may.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. BUTLER: This objection is intended to resolve the plan objection and another related filing not being heard today, which is their motion to lift stay filed in the Chapter 11 case.

First, Delphi is agreeing to lift the stay for a limited purpose of permitting the movant to perform an audit under the license agreement as set forth in Article 6 of the license agreement.

Second, Delphi and MPEG agreed to work together to resolve cure amounts including using reasonable efforts to fulfill MPEG's requests and also providing information regarding the use of the license by controlled companies as defined in the license agreement. Delphi will also use reasonable efforts to provide MPEG with reports that are timely as required by the agreement.

Third, to the extent the license agreement has

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assumed the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the license agreement will apply with respect to post-emergence obligations.

Fourth, the allowed cure amount will be paid in cash provided that no cure election form was mailed to MPEG. They didn't file it -- have the opportunity to file a cure election and I'll deal with that a little bit later, Your Honor. We, I think, discussed it in the brief. There was a small group of -- maybe not so small group of cure parties that we were able to verify were not mailed to cure notice. Under the proposed confirmation order their default has been reversed to be cash rather than the class treatment, the class 1C treatment because they were not given the opportunity by the debtors to consider the option. Otherwise -- and given the -- we had an opportunity to briefly examine the elections that were sent back. The majority elections sent back were to be received cash not to remain -- to receive treatment by -and so that we thought that was an appropriate disposition of that.

MPEG asserts they were in that category. We've not been able to verify that yet, but if they are, they'd be treated in the same fashion as those similarly situated.

Fifth, to the extent the license agreements rejected and the licensor satisfies the second circuit standard for

an administrative claim then their allowed administrative claim would also be paid in cash. I think that's, in fact, the law.

Finally, claims against -- any claims that they may have against -- that is, that MPEG may have against nondebtors that are independent of the commercial relationship between MPEG and the debtors are not covered under any third-party release contemplated in Article 11(5) of the plan and that is certainly acceptable to the debtors with respect to --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: -- the particular settlement.

THE COURT: Is that the language that you were waiting on, ma'am?

MS. DOWD: Yes, Your Honor. That's essentially correct. The only thing I wanted to clarify for the record is that the settlement is also -- encompasses MPEG parent. The Audio MPEG, Inc. is owned by an Italian entity, which we referred to in the pleadings as Sisvel, S-I-S-V-E-L, and they're bound by this as well. They filed a joint objection. It encompasses both of them.

And then on the point that Mr. Butler was talking about as best as we know, I would be surprised if it was anything other. We're not a material purchase supply. We didn't get the notice. We were in the other category of

other executory contracts.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. DOWD: So we didn't make it an election -- we weren't mailed anything and we're the fall-back category.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, if you can satisfy them of that they've agreed to that. When you say it includes S-S-V-E-L, obviously it's encompassed by it. You're not conflating the two. They each have their own relationship with the debtor.

MS. DOWD: It's one license agreement. There's both -- there's only one license agreement.

THE COURT: Okay. But they're treated as -- they're both treated as separate entities. You're not doing anything more than saying that this settlement applies to both of them.

MS. DOWD: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I think that will dispose of, I believe, all of the objections by either settlement or ruling of the court other than the objections of the unions carried to tomorrow and the objection, I believe, of Mr. Halazon related to management conference carried to tomorrow.

THE COURT: That portion of his objection?

MR. BUTLER: That portion of his objection. Other

than that, I think the objections have been disposed of and that would conclude the debtor's presentation, Your Honor, for the first day of the confirmation hearing and we plan to return at ten o'clock tomorrow.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: If that's acceptable to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. And again, just to be clear, the only evidentiary portion of the record that is still open is with regard to the debtor's case in support of the executive compensation elements of the plan and the union's objections to it.

In addition to that, we'll have some comments on the confirmation order, but only insofar as clarifying the record as to my belief, again leaving aside the issues that are reserved for tomorrow, but in all other respects that the 1129(a) requirements that have been met. As you know, the Court has an independent obligation to review those. A number of objections were settled that raised certain of those issues. I considered them independently and I'll address them tomorrow, but based on my review of the record and review of the case law and the Code, of course, I believe I'll be able to make the finding that the relevant provisions of 1129(a) have been satisfied.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, with respect -- just I'll say here on the record so parties can

consider it and talk with me afterwards on this matter, but with respect to the entry of the confirmation order Your Honor is prepared to grant confirmation tomorrow after the completion of the record and the presentations relating to it and any questions Your Honor has.

In addition to any comments Your Honor may be making we are still reviewing an additional rounds of comments from the statutory committees from General Motors and from the plan investors and want to complete that process in good faith.

Your Honor can imagine what the last number of hours have been like for the parties and so I think that probably the prudent thing to do tomorrow if Your Honor is prepared to grant confirmation would be to have the parties here, the Court's -- whatever the Court has to tell us, but I think I'd like the weekend to be able to research and consider comments and present an order on --

THE COURT: Tuesday.

MR. BUTLER: On Tuesday.

THE COURT: That's fine. Unlike the case with other orders, my comments so far at least are not on the drafting of the order but simply to note for the record in some instances why I am prepared to make the particular finding. For example, a finding that the plan does not run afoul of 1129(a)(4) -- I'm sorry, 1123(a)(4). Excuse

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me. And one or two similar instances. I don't contemplate giving you frankly based on my review the confirmation order any substantive comments on it.

MR. BUTLER: Well, thank you, Your Honor. With respect -- I would say tomorrow just again the one aspect for the record that tomorrow -- that I will also want to introduce and I just want to call the Court's attention to it. On 1128(a)(5) we dealt with this in a brief, we have the business of identifying officers and directors for the Court or a process of their selection. With respect to the subsidiary officer directors we intend to introduce an exhibit tomorrow that has that so it's in the evidentiary record. I think Your Honor is aware from our brief there's a process that was established that's in the plan. There's a selection committee that has representatives of the statutory committee or designees of them of the plan investors and if I'm trying to remember the -- I guess the debtor. I forgot somebody. Of the debtor as -- that are in the process of continuing their work on that. I think they expect to have that work completed by the effective date, but so it's -- we're asking for Your Honor to determine our compliance of 1128(5) both in the filing of the additional exhibit as it relates to the subsidiaries but as to the parent company based on the process and procedure that's been established in the plan in which

there is participation that I suggested. THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. All right. So I'll see you all at ten o'clock tomorrow. You can leave your materials here and that includes the screen. Just the last representative of the debtor check with the marshals to make sure the courtroom is locked. MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. (Proceedings concluded at 5:26 PM.)

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CERTIFICATION	
I, Pnina Eilberg, court approved transcriber, certify that the	
foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled	
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